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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Cheryl Lynn Cox,
Petitioner,
Appeal No. 20090866-CA
v.
Bruce Cox,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4103(2)(h), which grants the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over "appeals from a district
court involving domestic relations cases."
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue I: After appropriately finding that Bruce's property settlement payment was
in the nature of alimony, did the trial court err by extending Bruce's alimony obligation
four years beyond Cheryl's remarriage even though alimony automatically terminates
upon remarriage as a matter of law?
Standard of Review: "A trial court's determination of the law is reviewed under
a correctness standard; [the court of appeals affords] no degree of deference to a trial
3
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judge's determination of the law." United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington Cleveland
Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49,19, 79 P.3d 945. Though the trial court is accorded
considerable discretion in the modification of divorce decrees, its decision will be
reversed if it abuses its discretion or misapplies principles of law. Christensen v.
Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1981).
Issue II: Did the trial court have equitable authority, despite the plain language of
Utah Code section 30-3-5(9), to extend Bruce's alimony obligation after Cheryl had
remarried?
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's decision. See Connell v. Connell,
2010 UT App 139,1 6, 233 P.3d 836.
Issue III: Did the trial court erroneously craft an equitable remedy that was
inconsistent with the relevant law when it extended Bruce's alimony payments based on
Cheryl's expectation of payment, her separation from her new husband, and her
presumed inability to repay Bruce's overpayments?
Standard of Review: "[QJuestions about the legal adequacy of findings of fact
and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues of law, which [are
reviewed] for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." Van Dyke v. Van
Dyke, 2004 UT App 37, t 10, 86 P.3d 767. Although a district court is accorded
considerable latitude and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy,
"when the trial court has based its ruling upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of
4
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law, the reviewing court should correct the error and provide proper adjudication under
correct principles of law." Green River Canal Co. v. Olds (In re Gen. Determination of
Rights), 2004 UT 106, Tfl6, 110 P.3d 666 (internal quotation marks omitted); Ferris v.
Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979).
Issue IV: In the alternative, did the trial court abuse its discretion by not
terminating Bruce5 s alimony obligation on the first day of the month after he filed his
petition to modify?
Standard of Review: Although a district court is accorded considerable latitude
and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy, "when the trial court has
based its ruling upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of law, the reviewing court
should correct the error and provide proper adjudication under correct principles of law."
In re Gen. Determination of Rights, 2004 UT 106, ^f 16 (internal quotation marks
omitted); Ferris, 595 P.2d at 859.
Issue V: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that whether the divorce decree
awarded Cheryl a prospective increase in alimony upon the emancipation of her children
was a moot question, even though resolution of that question affected the court's
calculation of Bruce's judgment?
Standard of Review: "[T]he legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present
issues of law, which [are reviewed] for correctness, according no deference to the trial
court." Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 2004 UT App 37, ^ 10, 86 P.3d 767.
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following rules, statutes, and cases are determinative to this appeal and are
reproduced in their entirety in the Addenda to this brief:
•
•
•

Addendum A—Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2009)
Addendum B—Decree of Divorce, August 3, 2005
Addendum C—Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, February 8, 2011;
Order and Judgment on Petition to Modify, February 8, 2011
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2005, Bruce and Cheryl Cox divorced amicably after twenty-five years of

marriage. Cheryl retained a lawyer, who drafted a stipulated settlement and decree of
divorce. Bruce did not retain a lawyer. Bruce signed the divorce decree after minimal
discussion regarding its terms. The decree was entered by the court on August 30, 2005.
The terms of the divorce decree required Bruce to pay Cheryl $3,000 monthly for
combined "property settlement" and child support. The monthly payment was a
"property settlement" in name only. According to both Cheryl and Bruce, the purpose of
the monthly payment was to provide child support and a stream of income to Cheryl.
The evidence was undisputed that Bruce did not receive any real or personal property as
consideration for this monthly payment. For these reasons, the trial court concluded that
the "property settlement" was in the nature of alimony. Bruce punctually paid Cheryl
alimony every month until January 2009. In fact, Bruce inadvertently overpaid by $524
each month, resulting in a surplus payment of $20,960 by January 2009.

6
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In December 2006, just over a year after the divorce, Cheryl remarried. Shortly
after remarrying, she quit training to become a medical transcriptionist, and she has not
resumed any schooling or job training since her remarriage. Cheryl did not tell Bruce
about her new marriage, which he learned about eighteen months later, in June 2008. He
retained a lawyer six months later, in January 2009, who advised him that due to Cheryl's
remarriage, his alimony obligation had automatically terminated, and therefore he was
only obligated to pay child support for his one remaining minor child, which he did in the
amount of $695 each month. In February, Bruce filed a petition to modify the decree of
divorce. The issue finally went to trial on December 1, 2010.
After concluding that Bruce's monthly payment was in the nature of alimony, the
trial court acknowledged that according to statute, alimony automatically terminates upon
remarriage. But, the trial court extended Bruce's alimony obligation based on "equitable
grounds." As justification, the trial court provided the following reasons: (1) Cheryl had
relied on receiving $3,000 per month for ten years and, as a result, it was "reasonable to
determine" that she thought she still had time to finish job training before the monthly
payments ended; (2) Cheryl had been separated from her new husband for six weeks at
the time of trial; and (3) Bruce was in a "far better financial position than [Cheryl] to bear
the loss." Based on these "equitable grounds," the trial court's decision awarded Cheryl
the equivalent of $ 105,965 in alimony after she remarried.
The trial court then issued a judgment against Bruce for $32,055.00. The
judgment was calculated by assuming that Bruce continued to owe Cheryl $3,000 per
7
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month from January 2009 through the date of trial and that he had only paid $695 (his
child support obligation) for the prior 23 months, while acknowledging that Bruce had
previously overpaid Cheryl by $20,960 as of December 2008.
However, the trial court declined to address whether Bruce's $3,000 monthly
payment of combined alimony and child support should have decreased upon the
emancipation of his son in June 2007. The resolution of this question, which the trial
court concluded was moot, would have lowered Bruce's monthly obligation by $474
starting in June 2007. In total, as set out in the charts on page 42, this reduction would
have lowered the court's judgment against Bruce for unpaid alimony by $19,902.
The trial court also ordered Cheryl to pay Bruce $25,000 plus interest, as required
by the divorce decree, for his equitable lien on the marital residence, which was due
when Cheryl remarried. Bruce does not contest this order.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Bruce and Cheryl Cox were married in 1980. R. 369, % 1. They had four children,
but only two were minors at the time of divorce: N.K. Cox, born on January 8, 1989, and
T.A. Cox, bom January 13, 1993. R. 56,12. In June 2005, Cheryl notified Bruce that
she wanted a divorce. R. 369, Tf 2. She obtained an attorney, who drafted a Stipulation
and Property Settlement Agreement and sent it to Bruce on August 3, 2005. R. 369-70,
TT 3. Bruce did not retain an attorney. R. 14.

8
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With almost no negotiation, other than Bruce requesting a tax exemption for the
minor children (which he received) and the ability to deduct the mortgage interest on the
marital home (which he did not receive), Bruce signed the Stipulation and Property
Settlement Agreement drafted by Cheryl's attorney. R. 370, ]f 4. The Decree of Divorce
was entered by the court on August 30, 2005. R. 55.
The Decree of Divorce states, "Neither party shall be awarded alimony from the
other party." R. 60, ^j 10. However, it orders Bruce to pay Cheryl $3,000 per month for
ten years "as and for a final property settlement," which "shall include the child support
payment." Id. f 12. The base child support payment was set at $1,169, according to the
Uniform Child Support Guidelines, for both children. R. 56,1f 3.a. Upon the
emancipation of the older son, the child support obligation automatically reduced to
$695. R. 372,^10.
The evidence is undisputed that both parties understood that the purpose of the
monthly payment was to provide child support and a stream of income for Cheryl. R.
370,14; R. 372-73, ^ 13. At the time of the divorce, Cheryl was earning $900 per
month, and she lacked the training or job-related skills that would permit her to earn more
in the present economy. R. 370, ^ 5; R. 373-74, ^f 18. It was important to both parties
that Cheryl be supported financially while she obtained additional qualifications for
employment. R. 370, ^f 5. The intent to provide Cheryl with a steady income through
monthly payments is evident in the parties' communication regarding the divorce decree.
When Cheryl's lawyer first sent the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement to
9
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Bruce, the letter accompanying the proposed Stipulation and Property Settlement
Agreement contained the following paragraph:
You will notice that instead of an alimony payment for the
length of the marriage (25 years), Cheryl has decided to
request a $3,000 per month property settlement for ten (10)
years. This $3,000 amount includes the child support
payments. This will give Cheryl a steady income of $3,000
for ten years, which will allow her enough income to obtain
training so that she can get a job and support herself.
R. 369-70,1f 3; R. 123.
The evidence is undisputed that neither Bruce nor Cheryl understood the legal
difference between property settlements and alimony, the tax consequences of alimony,
or the basic legal rules governing the termination of alimony. R. 370, f 5; R. 373,1fl4.
As a result, none of these issues were discussed before the parties signed the Stipulation
and Property Settlement Agreement. R. 370,1fl[ 4, 5; R. 372-73, Tf 13. Furthermore, there
was virtually no property underlying the property settlement agreement—in other words,
Bruce received nothing of value in return for his promise to pay close to $300,000 over
ten years. R. 377, ^f 28; R. 372, ^ 12. But, both parties did understand that the property
settlement was "crafted to provide support in the form of a stream of income to
petitioner." R. 372-73, Tf 13. The property settlement provision did not mention
remarriage, death, or cohabitation. R. 372,112.
The monthly payment included Bruce's child support obligation for each of his
two minor children until they became emancipated by turning eighteen and graduating
from high school. R. 5613.a; R. 60,112; R. 371-72, f 10. Based on the Uniform Child
10
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Support Guidelines, the child support amounted to $1,169.00 per month for both children.
R. 371-72, f 10. The remainder of his monthly payment, $1,831.00, was alimony. In
June 2007, when Bruce's older child became emancipated, the amount of child support
automatically reduced to $695. Id. However, unaware that child support automatically
reduced upon emancipation, Bruce continued to pay $3,524 monthly through December
2008.1 R. 3 7 2 4 1 1 .
Finally, separate from Bruce's purported "property settlement" obligation, the
divorce decree equally divided what little marital property the parties owned. R. 370-71,
Tj 6. Cheryl received ownership and possession of the marital house, which had $50,000
worth of equity. Id.; R. 59-60, ^| 9. Bruce received an equitable lien on the property for
$25,000 (one half of the net equity accrued by the parties at the time of divorce) that
Cheryl was obligated to pay when: (1) both children became emancipated; (2) Cheryl
remarried; (3) Cheryl moved; or (4) Cheryl cohabited. R. 59-60, ]f 9. Cheryl also
received one half of Bruce's retirement account. R. 60, ^J11; R. 370-71, ^| 6. Other than
these two sources of property, "[t]here was absolutely no other property except the
parties' vehicles, which were of very little value, and each took his or her own vehicle."
R.370-71, ^[ 6. The trial court summarized the evidence as "overwhelmingly clear that
there was in fact no marital property, or for that matter even separate property, in

1

Bruce's monthly payments came directly from his account at the Credit Union. At trial,
he testified that he paid the additional $524 per month toward Cheryl's car payment and
that when she purchased a new car she arranged for the payments to continue being
deducted from his account at the Credit Union. Bench Trial Transcript R. 417: 32, 66-71.
11
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existence at the time of divorce that could fairly be said to be the subject of a property
settlement" of $3,000 per month for ten years. Id.
Bruce paid Cheryl $3,524 per month beginning September 2005 until December
2008. R. 372, f 11. The court did not make a determinative finding as to why Bruce
initially paid $3,524, rather than $3,000 monthly, but the evidence was undisputed that by
December 2008, he had overpaid by $20,960.00. R. 373,117. Bruce argued that the
overpayments were the result of his mistaken belief that he was obligated to make
Cheryl's car payments. R. 96; R. 79; Bench Trial Transcript R. 417, 32, 66-71. The
monthly payments were financially burdensome to Bruce. After paying alimony, his
"take-home pay" ranged between $132 and $2,725, depending on his overtime. R. 79.
Just over a year after the parties5 divorce, Cheryl remarried on December 29,
2006. R. 371, If 7. She did not notify Bruce that she remarried. R. 371,fflf7, 8.
Although it is not clear that she actively concealed her remarriage, she made no effort to
repay Bruce the $25,000 lien for his half of the home equity that came due upon her
remarriage. Id. After remarriage, Cheryl quit training as a medical transcriptionist, and
at the time of trial, she had not engaged in any other job training. R. 373-74, f 18. At the
time of trial, Cheryl and her new husband were "separated" and had been for six weeks.
R. 371, Tf 7. The trial court found that Cheryl was "not planning on reconciliation," but it
did not make any findings of fact as to whether Cheryl planned to divorce her new
husband or what sort of settlement or alimony she would receive if she were to divorce.
Id. Bruce presented evidence at trial that Cheryl's new husband, who works as a control
12
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room operator at the Huntington Canyon Coal Fired Generating Plant, makes between
$68,451.50 to $80,307.25 annually, not counting the income from the gym that he owns
and runs. R. 80; R. 168; R. 249.
Bruce learned about Cheryl's remarriage about a year and a half after the event.
R. 373, ]f 16. However, he continued to pay $3,524 monthly through December 2008
when, on the advice of counsel that he did not owe the full amount, he reduced his
payment to $695—the amount of child support then owing for one remaining child. R.
373, ^f 16. He continued to pay $695 every month thereafter. Id.
In February 2009, Bruce5s counsel filed a petition to modify the divorce decree,
alleging a material change in circumstances based on Cheryl's remarriage, the
emancipation of one child, and the $524 monthly overpayment. R. 374,fflj19, 20. He
also asked the court to determine that the "property settlement" was alimony and
therefore automatically terminated when Cheryl remarried. R. 374, ^f 19.
Trial Court's Decision
The trial court denied the petition to modify because it found that each of the
alleged changes in circumstance, except the $524 overpayment, was foreseeable at the
time of divorce. R. 374-75,1fl[ 21, 22. However, the trial court asserted its continuing
jurisdiction under Utah Code section 30-3-5(3) "to make subsequent changes or new
orders for . . . distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and
necessary." R. 374-75,122.

13
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The trial court first held that as a matter of law, the "property settlement" was in
actuality an agreement to pay alimony and child support for ten years. R. 376, f 25; R.
377-78, ]f 29. "Petitioner made no case, either legally or factually, in support of a claim
that the payments (except the child support portion) were anything other than a form of
spousal support." R. 376, ]f 25. Furthermore, "there was in fact virtually no property
underlying the property settlement agreement, and respondent received nothing of value
in return for his promise to pay close to $300,000 over ten years." R. 377, f 28.
Having determined that part of the property settlement was, in fact, alimony, the
trial court acknowledged that it was "obligated" to determine that the alimony payment
terminated by operation of law upon remarriage pursuant to Utah Code section 30-3-5(9).
R. 378, ^f 30. However, the trial court found "equitable grounds to postpone the date of
termination until the date of trial." Id.
The court elaborated on three reasons for postponing the alimony termination date.
First, that Cheryl "relied, in good faith," on the expectation that she would receive $3,000
per month for ten years, and so "it is reasonable to determine that [she] to this day
anticipated that she still has some time to complete necessary training to improve her
earning ability." R. 378, f 31. In support of this finding, the trial court stated that
"neither party initially recognized the effect of the property settlement characterization of
the support obligation" and neither party understood or relied on the statutory bases for
terminating support payments. Id.
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Second, Cheryl had been separated from her new husband for six weeks and the
court presumed that she lacked "any present or reasonably foreseeable future ability to
repay any sums that would be owed if the Court terminated the alimony at the earlier date
of remarriage, or even effective March 1, 2009, the first month after service of the
Petition to Modify." R. 379, | 32. Other than this statement, and the finding that Cheryl
made $900 dollars a month, the court made no other findings of fact as to Cheryl's
finances, including the finances of her new husband, who had also enjoyed the benefit of
Bruce's monthly payments after Cheryl remarried. Nor did the trial court make any
factual finding about Cheryl's finances. See Record,passim. The trial court reasoned
that because Cheryl relied on the alimony payments for ten years, and because Bruce had
"withheld" his alimony payment since January 2009, Cheryl was "without resources to
repay support if the termination date is earlier than the December 1, 2010 trial of this
matter." R. 379,1j 32.
Third, the trial court reasoned that it was modifying the decree of divorce based on
"a legal interpretation of an ambiguous provision that would work an injustice to [Bruce],
primarily prospectively, if he is required to continue paying the full support agreed even
after the last child emancipates." R. 379, ^ 33. The trial court also reasoned that Bruce
was "in a far better financial position to bear the loss" than Cheryl because his monthly
income was $7,764 and he was also entitled to receive a $25,000 payment for his
equitable lien on the marital home. Id.
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The trial court declined to determine whether the divorce decree awarded Cheryl a
prospective increase in alimony upon the emancipation of her children, concluding that
the issue was moot. R. 378, ^f 29. However, the trial court calculated Bruce's arrearages
assuming that Bruce owed Cheryl $3,000 per month even after his son emancipated in
June 2007. R. 383-387. This calculation assumed that the divorce decree prospectively
increased Cheryl's alimony from $1,831 to $2,305 after the first son's emancipation and
would have increased her alimony again in June 2011, when her youngest son
emancipated.
Based on these findings of fact, the trial court made six conclusions of law:
(1) that Bruce's obligation to make $3,000 monthly payments to Cheryl should terminate
effective the day of trial, December 1, 2010; (2) that after December 1, 2010, Bruce
would only be responsible for the remaining child support at the rate of $695 per month
until emancipation; (3) that Cheryl was entitled to a credit against Bruce for unpaid
alimony due and owing through November 30, 2010 in the amount of $32,055.00; (4)
that Bruce was entitled to a credit against Cheryl for his equitable lien in the amount of
$32,515.04; (5) that a judgment be entered in favor of Bruce for $460.04, representing the
difference between the two foregoing values, to bear interest at the post-judgment rate of
2.3% per year; and (5) that each party should pay their respective attorney fees. R. 381.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Having properly found that part of Bruce's monthly obligation to pay $3,000 was
in the nature of alimony, the trial court should have concluded that Bruce's alimony
obligation automatically terminated on December 29, 2006, when Cheryl remarried.
According to the plain language of Utah Code section 30-3-5(9), any court order
obligating a party to pay alimony automatically terminates upon the remarriage of the
receiving spouse, unless the decree of divorce specifically states otherwise. Cheryl and
Bruce's decree of divorce did not specifically state that Cheryl's monthly support
payments would continue even if she remarried, therefore, as a matter of law, the alimony
order automatically terminated when Cheryl remarried.
The trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation on "equitable grounds"
was erroneous for three reasons. First, the plain language of Utah Code section 30-3-5(9)
does not grant courts equitable authority to extend alimony beyond remarriage, unless the
decree of divorce specifically states otherwise. Second, the trial court lacked equitable
authority to retroactively award non-terminable alimony or to modify the decree of
divorce because there were no extenuating circumstances or substantial and material
changes that were not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Utah Code Aim. §§ 30-35(8)(g)(i), (ii). Third, even if the trial court had authority to extend Bruce's alimony
obligation on equitable grounds, the remedy was contrary to relevant law for the
17
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following reasons. The critical elements of equitable estoppel were not present in this
case, despite the trial court's assumption that Cheryl relied on the expectation of monthly
payments. Cheryl's separation from her husband did not justify extending Bruce's
alimony obligation, just as annulment does not necessarily justify extending former
alimony obligations beyond remarriage. And finally, Cheryl's inability to repay Bruce's
overpaid alimony obligation was not a need that existed at the time of divorce.
Therefore, the trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation on "equitable
grounds" should be reversed and this court should conclude that Bruce's alimony
obligation automatically terminated when Cheryl remarried.
In the alternative, the trial court abused its discretion by terminating Cheryl's
alimony on the date of the trial, December 2010, rather than the month following the date
that Bruce filed the petition to modify. The trial court offered no lawful equitable
explanation for diverging from the general rule set out in Utah Code section 78B-12112(4) that a modification of a spousal support payment may be made "only from the
date of service of the pleading on the obligee."
Finally, even if the trial court properly extended Bruce's alimony obligation, the
calculation of Bruce's arrearages was erroneous because it was based on an unresolved
issue. The trial court declined to address whether the divorce decree awarded Cheryl a
prospective increase in alimony upon the emancipation of each child, holding that the
question was moot. However, this question was not moot because it directly affected the
court's calculation of Bruce's arrearages. The divorce decree awarded $1,169 in child
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support, which means that the remainder of the monthly payment, $1,831, was alimony.
Because child support automatically reduces upon emancipation, Bruce's child support
obligation automatically reduced from $1,169 to $695 in June 2007—a difference of
$474. Therefore, his monthly obligation should have decreased by $474 in June 2007
because the divorce decree did not award Cheryl a prospective increase in alimony upon
the emancipation of each child. If the court had recognized the automatic statutory
reduction in Bruce's child support obligation, the court's final judgment against Bruce
would have only been $12,147—a difference of $19,902. Therefore, this issue was not
moot, and it should have been resolved by the trial court before calculating the amount of
Bruce's arrearages.
ARGUMENT
I.

T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
THE "PROPERTY SETTLEMENT59 IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS ALIMONY,
BUT IMPROPERLY EXTENDED B R U C E ' S ALIMONY OBLIGATION BEYOND
CHERYL'S REMARRIAGE.

The trial court properly held that part of Bruce's "property settlement" to Cheryl
was alimony because its purpose was to support Cheryl and there was no property to
divide in the amount that Bruce would pay over the life of his obligation. However, the
trial court erred by requiring Bruce to pay alimony after Cheryl's remarriage. First,
according to statute, court orders to pay alimony automatically terminate upon the
remarriage of the receiving spouse, unless the decree of divorce specifically states
otherwise, which it did not. Second, the legislature did not grant the court equitable
authority to retroactively extend alimony payments beyond remarriage.
19
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A.

The Trial Court Properly Concluded That Part of the "Property
Settlement" Was in the Nature of Alimony.

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently stated that "it is the duty of the court to
look to substance rather than form" when characterizing the nature of a debt imposed by
a decree of divorce. Holt v. Holt, 672 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1983) (internal quotations
omitted); Erickson v. Beardall, 437 P.2d 210, 212 (Utah 1968). The label chosen by the
parties to characterize Bruce's $3,000 monthly payment to Cheryl for ten years is not
determinative of its character. See Beckman v. Beckman, 685 P.2d 1045, 1050 (Utah
1984) (label "property settlement agreement" was not determinative); Bott v. Bott, 453
P.2d 402, 402 (Utah 1969) ("It's not the label placed by decree upon payments which
constitutes them either alimony or lump sum property settlements."). This rule
recognizes that parties may choose to characterize an alimony payment as a property
settlement for many reasons, including tax avoidance. See Beckman, 685 P.2d at 1050.
To determine whether a "property settlement" is really alimony, courts look at whether
the spouse would have been adequately supported without the award and other facts,
including the nature and structure of the award. Holt, 672 P.2d at 743-44; Lyon v. Lyon,
206 P.2d 148, 150 (Utah 1949). The trial court's conclusion that a portion of Bruce's
$3,000 monthly obligation was in the nature of alimony was legally and factually
accurate for three reasons.
First, without alimony, Cheryl could not support herself. A payment or debt
assumption is in the nature of alimony or support if "the plaintiffs means of support
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would have been inadequate without the provision of the decree that the defendant pay
these obligations." Holt, 672 P.2d at 743-44; see also Beckman, 685 P.2d at 1050 ("[I]f
without the debt assumption, the spouse would be inadequately supported, the debt
assumption was meant to be support." (internal quotations omitted)). According to the
trial court, Cheryl was only earning $900 per month, and she lacked the training or jobrelated skills that would permit her to earn more in the present economy. See R. 370, ]f 5.
The evidence before the court clearly demonstrated that Cheryl could not support herself
without alimony.
Second, the purpose of the property settlement was to support and maintain
Cheryl. In Bott v. Bott, even though the parties labeled an award of $2400 as a settlement
"in lieu of alimony," the court found that because the purpose of the payment was to
provide for the support and maintenance of Mrs. Bott it was in the nature of alimony.
Bott, 453 P.2d at 403. This case is very similar to Bott. In paragraph 10, the divorce
decree says, "Neither party shall be awarded alimony from the other party," but, even
according to Cheryl's lawyer, the purpose of the property settlement was "to provide a
steady income" to Cheryl. R. 60, lj 10; R. 123; R. 369, \ 3. Both parties considered it
important that Cheryl be supported while she obtained additional qualifications for
employment. R. 370, \ 5. Thus, the trial court properly found that monthly payments
were "crafted to provide support in the form of a stream of income to the petitioner," and
therefore were in the nature of alimony. R. 372-73,^f 13; R. 377-78, f 29.
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Third, the trial court properly concluded that the structure of the payment itself
was in the nature of alimony rather than a property settlement award. See Lyon, 106 P.2d
at 150. The trial court found the evidence "overwhelmingly clear" that there was no
marital property, or separate property, that could be said to be the subject of a property
settlement. R. 370, ^ 6. The parties owned a house with $50,000 of equity and Bruce
had a retirement account, both of which were divided fairly and equally in the divorce
decree. R. 370-71, ]f 6. There was "absolutely no other property" left to be divided, and
yet, at the end often years, Bruce would have paid Cheryl $298,461 in "property
settlement" payments. R. 372,112. Because the parties did not have $600,000 worth of
property to divide, id., the trial court properly concluded that a portion of Bruce's $3,000
monthly payments was in the nature of alimony.
Finally, the trial court properly pointed out that even Cheryl does not dispute that
part of the property settlement was, in fact, alimony or support. "Petitioner made no
case, either legally or factually, in support of a claim that the payments (except the child
support portion) were anything other than a form of spousal support." R. 376, f 25.

2

It is not entirely clear how the trial court reached this number. If the court utilized the
following method to calculate Bruce's obligation then his total should have been
$302,091, a difference of $3,630 from the trial court's number.
$1831x21 months-$38,451
$2305 x 48 months- $110,640
$3000 x 51 months- $153,000
$302,091
22
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Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that part of Bruce's monthly payments were
alimony was both legally and factually accurate.
B.

Bruce's Alimony Obligation Automatically Terminated Upon Cheryl's
Remarriage,
i

Once the trial court concluded that part of the "property settlement" payment was
alimony, as a matter of law, Bruce's alimony obligation automatically terminated on
December 29, 2006, when Cheryl remarried. Utah law is clear. Alimony payments
automatically terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient spouse. Ostermiller v.
Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249, H 2,190 P.3d 13; Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 252
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1984). The trial court's
decision to extend Bruce's alimony payments is contrary to statute, case law, and public
policy.
In 1979, the legislature codified the legal principle announced by the Utah
Supreme Court twenty five-years earlier in Austad v. Austad, that "alimony continues
only so long as the wife remains unmarried." 269 P.2d 284, 290 (Utah 1954). The
principle has remained virtually unchanged since its announcement. Compare Lord, 682
P.2d at 855 with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9). Today, this principle is codified in Utah
Code section 30-3-5(9), which provides: "Unless a decree of divorce specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse." Thus,
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Utah law is clear, if a divorce decree is silent as to remarriage, alimony automatically
terminates upon the remarriage of the recipient spouse.
In this case, the trial court erred by extending Bruce's alimony obligation because
the parties' divorce decree did not provide that Bruce's monthly support obligation would
survive Cheryl's remarriage—it was silent as to remarriage. See R. 60, % 12. Therefore,
the trial court should have held that according to the plain language of Utah Code section
30-3-5(9), the court order requiring Bruce to pay Cheryl alimony automatically
terminated on December 29, 2006, when Cheryl remarried. See Johnson, 855 P.2d at 252
("Alimony is presumed to terminate upon the remarriage of the receiving spouse."). C.f.
Connecticut Nat Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("We have stated time
and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
this first cannon [of construction] is also the last and judicial inquiry is complete.").
The automatic termination rule has been consistently applied in court. For
example, in Ostermiller, the court of appeals reversed a trial court's award of retroactive
alimony because the wife remarried during the pendency of the divorce, and therefore,
the obligation to pay alimony "terminated before it ever arose." 2008 UT App 249, % 2.
In Kelley v. Kelley, the parties ended a fourteen year marriage with a sham divorce
designed to avoid creditors. 2000 UT App 236, f 3, 9 P.3d 171. But, because they
continued to live together as husband and wife for the next two years, the trial court
found that they entered into a common law marriage the day after their divorce. Id, \ 6.
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When the parties truly divorced two years later, the trial court awarded the wife alimony
for the full sixteen years of marriage. Id. f 10. On review, the court of appeals reversed
the trial court's order for alimony based on the entire length of the marriage (16 years)
because the wife's right to alimony from the first marriage automatically terminated
when she "remarried" her previous husband in the common law marriage. Id. ^ 36. In
Russell v. Russell, even though the wife's remarriage was annulled five months later, as a
matter of law, her right to alimony from her former husband had automatically terminated
upon remarriage. 587 P.2d 133, 134 (Utah 1978).
In 1972, the Utah Supreme Court succinctly articulated the public policy for
automatically terminating alimony upon remarriage: "[I]n the case of a remarriage . . .
the wife has chosen to look to her second husband for support, and such husband is
legally bound to support her, and therefore, it would be inequitable for her to obtain the
right of support from two sources." Cecil v. Cecil, 356 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1972); see
also Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980) ("[T]he statute is and
should be directed, to prevent injustice to a spouse who frequently pays through the nose,
so to speak, to an undeserving exmate."); accord Gary L. Young, Jr., Annotation,
Alimony as Affected by Recipient Spouse's Remarriage in Absence of Controlling
Specific Statute, 47 ALR 5th 129, §2(a) (1997) (explaining that the automatic termination
of alimony is based on the public rejection of a situation where a spouse currently
receiving alimony support from a former spouse also receives support from a new
spouse).
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The facts of this case illustrate the wisdom of the automatic termination rule. By
both parties' accounts, the purpose of Bruce's alimony payment was to support Cheryl as
she went back to school in order to develop marketable skills. R. 369, ^|3; R. 370, | 5; R.
373, If 13. Indeed, Cheryl began attending school shortly after the divorce, but she
stopped when she remarried. R. 373, f 18. In the four-and-a-half years since her
remarriage, Cheryl has not engaged in any other job training. Id. Because Cheryl has
chosen to rely on her new husband for support and maintenance, Bruce should no longer
bear this responsibility. See, e.g., English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)
("The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife and not to inflict punitive
damages on the husband. Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the husband nor a
reward to the wife."); see also Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292,125, 242 P.3d 787 (one of
the "primary purposes" of alimony is to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a
public charge).
All of the cases discussed above illustrate that courts consistently and strictly
enforce the statutory presumption that alimony automatically terminates upon remarriage,
unless the decree of divorce specifically states otherwise. The trial court erred by
disregarding this deeply entrenched principle of law, and its decision should be reversed.
II.

T H E TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXTENDED BRUCE'S ALIMONY
OBLIGATION ON "EQUITABLE GROUNDS."

The trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation on "equitable grounds"
was erroneous for three reasons. First, Utah Code section 30-3-5(9) does not grant courts
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equitable authority to extend alimony orders that automatically terminate upon
i

remarriage. Second, the trial court lacked authority to retroactively change the divorce
decree and award non-terminable alimony. Third, even if the trial court had equitable
authority to extend Bruce's alimony obligation, the remedy was contrary to relevant law.
A. Utah Code Section 30-3-5(9) Does Not Grant Courts Equitable Authority to
Extend Alimony Payments That Automatically Terminate Upon
Remarriage.
It was improper for the trial court to extend Bruce's alimony payments based on
"equitable grounds/' because the plain language of section 30-3-5(9) does not grant the
court equitable authority to extend alimony beyond remarriage. See Hall v. Corwell,
2008 UT App 49, f 12, 179 P.3d 821 ("When the legislature has spoken clearly on an
issue, [courts] are not free to second-guess its wisdom on the grounds of policy.").
When the Utah Supreme Court first articulated the automatic termination rule in
Austad v. Austad, it reserved equitable authority to avoid enforcing the rule where "under
some exceptional circumstances this result might be so unconscionable or inequitable that
the court, under its equitable powers would decree that the wife does not lose her right to
alimony upon remarriage." 269 P.2d 284, 291 (Utah 1954). However, when the
legislature codified the automatic termination rule in 1979, it did not include this
equitable escape hatch. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9).
Looking at section 30-3-5 as a whole demonstrates that the legislature
intentionally granted equitable authority in several other subsections, but chose not to
grant any in subsection (9). For example, courts may modify alimony based on needs or
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circumstances that did not exist at the time the divorce decree was entered if "the court
finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action." Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(8)(g)(ii). Similarly, alimony may be ordered for a duration longer than the number of
years of the marriage, if the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify a longer
period. Id, § 30-3-5(8)(h). Also, courts have discretion to consider the income of a
payor's subsequent spouse if the payor's improper conduct justifies it. Id. § 30-35(8)(g)(iii)(B). Finally, the legislature explicitly granted courts "discretion" to depart
from the general rule that alimony should be based on the standard of living at the time of
separation. Id. § 30-3-5(8)(c).
In contrast, the language in subsection (9) is audibly silent about discretion or
extenuating circumstances. It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when
legislative silence contrasts with a consistent pattern in law that expressly authorizes
departures from a general rule, the legislative silence may be "audible." See
Congressional Research Service, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent
Trends, 16 (Aug. 31, 2008) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf; see
also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 61, 62 (1998) (congressional silence was
"audible" against a well-settled backdrop of common law); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S.
647, 629 (1978) (within comprehensive legislative scheme, congressional silence was
"pregnant" with meaning).
The trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation beyond remarriage
improperly rendered the statutory term "automatically terminates" in subsection (9)
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inoperative. The primary goal of the court when construing statutes is to "evince the true
intent and purpose of the Legislature as expressed through the plain language of the Act."
Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 UT App 75, ^f 7, 45 P.3d 520 (internal quotations omitted).
In so doing, courts seek to render all parts of the statute relevant and meaningful, and
avoid interpretations that make portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative. Id.
However, the trial court's interpretation ignored the term "automatically terminates,"
thereby rendering it meaningless and inoperative.
Further proof that the legislature clearly expressed its intent through the statute's
plain language is the fact that the term "automatically terminates" is distinctly used in
subsection (9). Other portions of section 30-3-5 do not grant relief until the party has
established grounds for relief, such as the fact that the former spouse is cohabiting with
another person, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10); or that the decree of divorce should be
modified based on a "substantial material change in circumstances," id. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i).
Subsection (9), however, provides that any court order "automatically terminates upon
the remarriage." Id. § 30-3-5(9). The unambiguous language establishes that the
alimony obligation ends upon the occurrence of remarriage, just like the child support
statute provides that child support obligations are "automatically reduced" when a child
becomes emancipated. See, e.g., Johansen, 2002 UT App 75, f 11. Because the
legislature spoke clearly, and the decree was otherwise silent, the trial court should not
have second-guessed the legislature's wisdom by ignoring the statutory terra
"automatically terminates."
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Because alimony automatically terminates upon remarriage, the trial court should
have retroactively relieved Bruce from his alimony obligation as of December 29, 2006,
the date of Cheryl's remarriage. In Black v. Black, the court of appeals made this point
when interpreting a separate provision, Utah Code section 30-3-5(10), which terminates
alimony upon the establishment of cohabitation. 2008 UT App 465, f 10, 199 P.3d 371.
Both subsection (9) and subsection (10) evince an "express mandate that the order
imposing alimony terminate automatically . . . thereby eliminating any future alimony
awards." Id, | 8. But, due to the amorphous nature of a new relationship, subsection (10)
"wisely leaves decisions regarding retroactivity to the trial court," while subsection (9)
provides for automatic termination because "the time of a death or remarriage is fixed
and easy to establish in the usual case." Id, ]f 10; see also Johansen, 2002 UT App 75, fflf
11,13 (plain language in child support statute indicating that upon emancipation, child
support award is "automatically reduced" entitled petitioner to retroactive reduction of
child support as of the date of his daughters' respective emancipations).
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law by extending Bruce's alimony
obligation based on "equitable grounds," when according to the plain language of
subsection (9), Bruce's alimony obligation automatically terminated upon Cheryl's
remarriage and the court lacked equitable authority to extend Bruce's alimony obligation.
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B. The Trial Court Lacked Equitable Authority to Award Non-Terminable
Alimony or to Retroactively Modify the Divorce Decree.

<

Trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to modify decrees of divorce, however this
authority cannot justify retroactively awarding Cheryl non-terminable alimony without
any extenuating circumstances or substantial and material changes that were not
foreseeable at the time of divorce.
By extending Bruce's alimony payment beyond Cheryl's remarriage, the trial court
effectively awarded Cheryl non-terminable alimony through December 2010, but the
facts relied upon were legally inadequate to justify an award of non-terminable alimony.
Non-terminable alimony must be justified by "adequate and specific findings of fact"
because alimony is "presumed to terminate upon the remarriage of the receiving spouse."
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1993). In Johnson, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's award of nonterminable alimony because the justification
offered—"to assist in the support of [the spouse]"—was inadequate. "To allow
nonterminable awards to be based on this justification alone would violate the statutory
presumption against such awards, since every alimony award is necessarily based upon
this justification." Johnson, 855 P.2d at 252; see also Black v. Barney, 2000 UT App
369, *2 (mem.) (need and ability to pay do not justify nonterminable alimony because
these are findings in every alimony award). Like Johnson, the only justifications offered
by the trial court for awarding non-terminable alimony were Cheryl's need for support
and Bruce's ability to pay. See R. 372-73, \ 13 (sole purpose of property settlement was
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to support Cheryl); R. 379, f 33 (justifying extension of alimony obligation on Bruce's
ability to bear the loss). Neither of these facts overcome the statutory presumption
against non-terminable alimony awards.
Furthermore, the trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation was untimely
because it extended Bruce's alimony obligation after it had already terminated. Alimony
awards can only be modified before they terminate, and they terminate when all the
awarded alimony has been paid. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah Ct. App.
1998). This case presents the flip side of the rule announced in Wilde. In Wilde, the wife
petitioned to modify the divorce decree and extend the length of time that she would
receive alimony. 969 P.2d at 440. The trial court dismissed her petition to modify as
untimely because she filed four months after her alimony award terminated pursuant to
the divorce decree. Id. at 443. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling
because the husband was behind in his payments and had not completed his alimony
obligation. "[W]hen alimony is still being paid, an application for new alimony is timely.
.. . The actual date the last required payment is made controls." Wilde, 969 P.2d at 443.
In contrast to the payor in Wilde, Bruce was current with his payments. Therefore, when
Bruce's alimony obligation automatically terminated on December 29, 2006, he had
already made his last required payment. Under the rule announced in Wilde, December
29, 2006 also marked the last opportunity to modify or extend Bruce's alimony
obligation. To the extent that the trial court's order modified Bruce's alimony obligation
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by extending it or making it non-terminable, the modification was untimely and therefore
unlawful.
Finally, trial courts only have authority to modify alimony awards when there are
extenuating circumstances or substantial and material changes that were not foreseeable
at the time of the divorce. Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-5(8)(g)(i),(ii). In this case, the trial
court did not list any extenuating circumstances. See Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 2004 UT
App 37, ^[ 11, 86 P.3d 767 (reversing trial court's extension of alimony obligation beyond
period listed in divorce decree because trial court failed to consider whether the extension
was justified by "extenuating circumstances"). Nor did the trial court find substantial and
material changes that were unforeseeable at the time of divorce. To the contrary, the trial
court specifically rejected Bruce's argument that Cheryl's remarriage and the
emancipation of Bruce's son justified modifying the divorce decree because both of those
occurrences were foreseeable at the time of divorce. R. 374, f 21. "Before a trial court
can modify a divorce decree, it must find that there has been a substantial material change
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce." Van Dyke, 2004 UT App 37,
f 12; Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, ]f 8, 983 P.2d 1103 (trial court's
failure to delineate what circumstances have changed and why these changes support the
modification constitutes reversible error). Finally, Cheryl did not file a petition to modify
the decree of divorce, and yet the trial court's decision effectively modified the decree of
divorce to award her non-terminable alimony. Because the "threshold requirement for
relief was not established for modifying the decree of divorce to award Cheryl non33
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terminable alimony, the trial court lacked equitable authority to extend Bruce5s alimony
obligation beyond remarriage. Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983)
(reversing trial court's modification of a divorce decree because the court's factual
findings did not establish changed circumstances—the threshold requirement for relief).
Therefore, the trial court's extension of Bruce's alimony obligation on equitable grounds
was contrary to law and should be reversed.
C. Even If the Trial Court Had Equitable Authority, It Erred by Creating a
Remedy That Was Inconsistent with the Relevant Law.
The trial court offered three justifications for postponing the termination of Bruce's
alimony payments on equitable grounds. First, that Cheryl "relied, in good faith," on the
expectation that support payments would continue for ten years. R. 378-79,fflf31-32.
Second, that Cheryl was separated from her new husband. R. 379, f 32. Third, that
Bruce is in a better financial position than Cheryl to bear the loss, and that Cheryl lacks
the resources to repay support if the court terminated alimony any earlier than the date of
trial (December 1, 2010). Id. These reasons are legally inadequate. Even when
exercising equitable discretion, the trial court is bound by the law. Rees v. Watertown, 86
U.S. 107, 122 (1874) ("A Court of equity cannot, by avowing that there is a right but no
remedy known to the law, create a remedy in violation of law .. . ."); INS v. Pangilinan,
486 U.S. 875, 883 (1988) ("Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and
constitutional requirements and provisions than can courts of law." (quoting Hedges v.
Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893)); see also Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230
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(Utah 1997) (even when exercising discretion, a trial court "must make the findings of
i

fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions"). In this case, the trial court erred by
creating an equitable remedy that was inconsistent with the law.
1. Cheryl's expectation does not justify extending Bruce's alimony obligation.

i

The trial court stated that Cheryl relied in good faith on the expectation that the
support payments would continue for ten years. R. 378-79, ff 31, 32. However,
<

Cheryl's expectation of continued alimony payments makes no legal difference in this
case because the critical elements of equitable estoppel—a statement inducing reliance
and detrimental reliance—are not present. See Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046, 1048
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147, 148 (1979) (no estoppel where the
plaintiff did not mislead the defendant and the defendant did not change his position to
his detriment in reliance on representations from the plaintiff).
First, Bruce made no statement inducing reliance. It is undisputed that if the
"property settlement" had been labeled "alimony" it would have automatically terminated
as a matter of law, regardless of Cheryl's expectations. The only difference in this case is
that the alimony payment was labeled as a "property settlement," rather than alimony—a
characterization that was meaningless to both parties. R. 377-78, ]f 29. The trial court
explicitly found that "neither party recognized the effect of the property settlement
characterization of the support obligation." R. 378, \ 31. In sum, Bruce made no
statement inducing reliance and the characterization of the monthly payment as a
property settlement, rather than alimony, did not induce reliance.
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Second, the trial court presumed, rather than found, detrimental reliance with the
following statement: "It is reasonable to determine that [Cheryl] to this day anticipated
that she still has some time to complete necessary training to improve her earning
ability." R. 378, ]f 31. There are no explicit findings of fact as to whether Cheryl actually
relied on the expectation that Bruce would continue to support her with alimony
payments despite her remarriage. Furthermore, the facts do not support the trial court's
"reasonable" presumption. Cheryl began job training shortly after the divorce became
final, and only quit her job training after she remarried. So, it is equally reasonable to
determine that upon remarriage, Cheryl anticipated that she would be cared for by her
new husband, so she stopped her job training—a characterization that suggests that
Cheryl detrimentally relied on the support of her new husband. Additionally, as of
February 2009, when Bruce filed his petition to modify, Cheryl was on notice that her
steady stream of support from Bruce could soon terminate, and yet she did not take the
opportunity to pursue any additional job training during the two years that Bruce's
petition to modify was pending.
In summary, the crucial elements of equitable estoppel were absent. There is no
indication that Bruce misled Cheryl in any way, or that Cheryl changed her position to
her detriment in reliance on Bruce's representations. Therefore, the trial court crafted an
equitable remedy that was inconsistent with the law when it extended Bruce's alimony
obligation based on Cheryl's presumed reliance.

36
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

2. Cheryl's separation from her second husband does not justify extending
Bruce's alimony obligation.
The trial court erroneously cited the fact that Cheryl is now separated from her
new husband as a justification for continuing Bruce's alimony obligation on equitable
grounds. Just as annulment does not automatically reinstate alimony from a former
spouse, Cheryl's mere separation from her second husband does not justify extending
Bruce's alimony payments. Ferguson v. Ferguson addressed an analogous situation, in
which a wife petitioned for the reinstatement of alimony payments from her first husband
after the annulment of her remarriage. 564 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977). The Ferguson court
held that "an annulment of the subsequent marriage should not automatically restore the
alimony awarded under the prior decree," but that courts could reinstate alimony if "it
appears clearly and persuasively that is necessary to rectify serious inequity or
injustice."3 Id. at 1383. If annulment alone does not justify automatically reinstating a
party's right to alimony, surely mere separation for six weeks cannot justify extending
Cheryl's right to alimony despite her remarriage.
Ferguson illustrates two problems with extending Bruce's alimony payment based
on Cheryl's separation from her second husband. First, Cheryl and her new husband may
reconcile, or may be collusively separated. Even the Ferguson court acknowledged the
unsavory possibility that the parties to the second marriage could collusively divorce with
3

The legislature later reduced the trial court's discretion by codifying this rule in the
second half of Utah Code section 30-3-5(9), which states that "if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined."
37.
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the purpose of restoring alimony entitlements. Id. at 1382. Second, unlike an annulment,
if Cheryl does divorce her second husband, she will be entitled to a divorce settlement,
which may include alimony. Therefore, the equitable concern addressed in Ferguson and
other annulment cases, in which the wife lost her right to alimony without receiving an
alternative source of support, does not apply to Cheryl's case.
Finally, even if Cheryl's separation could justify extending Bruce's alimony
payments, the trial court failed to clearly and persuasively explain why extending Bruce's
alimony was necessary to rectify serious inequity or injustice, as required by the
analogous case law. As demonstrated in the table below, in January 2009, Bruce had
already paid Cheryl $52,950 in alimony since her remarriage (not counting child support)
and had inadvertently overpaid an additional $20,960 from September 2005 to December
2009. The trial court did not explain why Cheryl was entitled to this windfall or why she
was further entitled to an additional 22 months of alimony payments at $2,305 per month
that accrued during the pendency of the litigation.
Total monthly
payment from
09/2005 to
12/2008
(40 months)
$3,524

Total =$140,960

Subtotal from
09/2005 to 12/2008
that was child support
(40 months)

Subtotal from
09/2005 to 12/2008
that was alimony
(40 months)

$1169x22
months=$25,718
$695x18
months=$12,510
Total = $38,228

$1831x22 months
= $40,282
$2,305 x 18 months
= $41,490
Total = $81,772

Inadvertent
overpayment
from 09/2005 to
12/2008
(40 months)
$524 x 40 months
= $20,960

Total = $20,960

Alimony paid after
Cheryl's remarriage
01/2007 to 12/2008
(24 months)
$1831 x 5 months=
$9,155
$2305 x 19 months=
$43,795
Total = $52,950

In short, the trial court did not explain how extending Bruce's alimony obligation
beyond Cheryl's remarriage was necessary to rectify serious inequity or injustice. In fact,
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the only mention of "injustice" was in paragraph 33, where the trial court noted that the
i

divorce decree "would work an injustice to [Bruce], primarily prospectively, if he is
required to continue paying the full support agreed even after the last child emancipates."
R. 379, f 33. Therefore, the trial court erred by crafting an equitable remedy that was
inconsistent with the law when it relied on Cheryl's separation from her second husband
as a justification for extending Bruce5 s alimony payments.
3. Cheryl's inability to repay undeserved alimony payments does not justify
extending Bruce's alimony obligation.
The trial court justified extending Bruce's alimony payments beyond remarriage
by saying that Bruce was "in a far better financial position than petitioner to bear the loss
incurred up to the present" and that Cheryl is "without the resources to repay support" if
alimony were terminated before December 1, 2010. R. 379,fflf32, 33. However,
alimony awards should only be based on needs that existed at the time the divorce decree
was awarded, unless a substantial and material change in circumstances or extenuating
circumstances justify modifying the alimony award. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-5(8)(g)
(i), (ii).
Obviously, Cheryl's inability to repay Bruce's overpayment of alimony is not a
need that existed at the time the divorce decree was awarded, so that fact alone cannot
justify extending Bruce's alimony payment. And the trial court failed to list either
extenuating circumstances or substantial and material changes that were not foreseeable
at the time of divorce. See Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 2004 UT App 37, If 12, 86 P.3d 767
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(before modifying a divorce decree, the trial court must make explicit and sufficiently
detailed findings with enough subsidiary facts to justify the court's action). In fact, the
trial court explicitly made the opposite conclusion. R. 375,122 (remarriage and
emancipation are not substantial and material changes because they are foreseeable).
Furthermore, because nonpayment of previously ordered support cannot alone constitute
a substantial change of circumstances, Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, \ 35, 9 P.3d
171, Bruce's overpayment of previously ordered support should not justify modifying the
decree of divorce to extend his alimony obligation.
Therefore, the trial court erred by crafting an equitable remedy that was
inconsistent with the law when it extended Bruce's alimony payment based on his ability
to bear the loss and Cheryl's presumed inability to repay the windfall that she enjoyed.
III.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED
BRUCE 'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION ON THE M O N T H FOLLOWING SERVICE OF
THE PETITION FOR MODIFICATION.

In the alternative, even if Bruce's alimony obligation did not automatically
terminate when Cheryl remarried, the trial court should have terminated alimony
retroactively to the month following the date that Bruce filed his petition to modify in
February 2009. According to Utah Code section 78B-12-112(4), if a tribunal modifies a
spousal support order in response to a petition for modification, "the effective date of the
modification shall be the month following service." The trial court's justification for
diverging from this general rule was clear error. In paragraph 32, the trial court reasoned
that "because respondent has withheld the 'alimony' portion since the beginning of 2009,
40
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petitioner is without resources to repay support if the tennination date is any earlier than
December 1, 2010." R. 379, f 32. This reasoning does not make sense. Because Bruce
had not paid alimony since February 2009, Cheryl would not have to "repay support" for
the 22 months of alimony that Bruce "withheld." Furthermore, ordering Bruce to pay
Cheryl so that she can repay Bruce does not serve the interests of justice and equity.
Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Cheryl alimony during the
pendency of the litigation without any rational justification for its departure from the
standard rule set out in Utah Code section 78B-12-112(4).
IV.

T H E TRIAL C O U R T ' S FAILURE TO ADDRESS W H E T H E R CHERYL'S ALIMONY
INCREASED UPON THE EMANCIPATION OF H E R CHILDREN W A S CLEAR
ERROR.

The divorce decree states that Bruce's "property settlement" includes his child
support obligation. R. 60, f 12. At trial, Cheryl argued that despite this provision, Bruce
was obligated to pay her $3,000 per month—meaning that as his child support obligation
automatically reduced when his children became emancipated, his alimony obligation
increased by an equal amount. R. 371-72, f 10. The trial court declined to address this
question, concluding that it was moot. R. 378, ^ 29. However, this question was not
moot because it dramatically affected the trial court's calculation of Brace's arrearages.
"A moot claim has lost its ability to provide judicial relief to the litigants," Shipman v.
Evans, 2004 UT 44, f 37, 100 P.3d 1151, but Cheryl nonetheless received judicial relief
on this issue.
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When calculating Bruce's judgment, the trial court assumed that Bruce was
obligated to pay $3,000 per month, even though "[t]hat issue still awaits decision." See
Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32,110, 114 P.3d 580 (issue that still awaited decision was
not moot because it could still provide relief to the litigants). The trial court attached an
exhibit labeled "Final Accounting of Payments Made By Respondent," which compared
the "amount due" to the "amount paid." R. 383-86. The trial court listed Brace's
alimony obligation as $3,000 through December 1, 2010, even though Brace's son had
become emancipated in June 2007. Id, Using this assumption, the trial court issued a
judgment against Brace for $32,055.00. R. 381, ]f 3. As demonstrated in the tables
below, the judgment against Brace would have been $19,902 less if the trial court had
considered and rejected Cheryl's argument.
Trial Court's Calculations
Bruce's total monthly
obligation from
1/2009 to 11/2010

Total from 01/2009
to 11/2010 that was
child support (paid)

Total from 01/2009
to 11/2010 that was
alimony (unpaid)

$3,000x23 months
Total = $69,000

$695 x 23 months
Total-$15,985

$2,305 x 23
Total-$53,015

Bruce's credit from
previous monthly
overpayment of $524
from 09/2005 to
12/2008
$524 x 40
Total = $20,960

Total judgment
against Bruce

$53,015-$20,960
Total = 32,055

Re-Calculation If Emancipation Reduced Bruce's Monthly Obligation
Bruce's total
monthly obligation
from 1/2009 to
11/2010

Bruce's credit from
overpayment of
child support from
7/2007 to 1/2009

Total from 01/2009
to 11/2010 that was
alimony (unpaid)

$2526 x 23 months
Total = $58,098

$474x19 months
Total = $9,006

$1,831x23 months
Total = $42,113

Bruce's credit from
previous monthly
overpayment of
$524 from 09/2005
to 12/2008
$524 x 40 months
Total = $20,960
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Total recalculated
judgment against
Bruce

$42,113-$29,966
Total = $12,147

(

Therefore, the interpretation of Bruce's alimony/support obligation was not a moot
i

question because it dramatically affected Bruce's rights. Burkett v. Schwendirnan, 773
P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989) (An issue is deemed moot when "the requested judicial relief
cannot affect the rights of the litigants."). The trial court's mootness holding was a clear
error of law and should be reversed.
Moreover, this court can and should interpret the divorce decree according to its
plain language, which did not specifically indicate that Cheryl's alimony award would
increase prospectively when her children emancipated. Alimony and child support are
separate legal obligations that cannot be substituted one for the other. Although the
divorce decree did not characterize Cheryl's support payment as alimony, it did clearly
indicate that $1,169.00 of the $3,000 monthly payment would be child support. R. 56,
f 3.a. Consequently, the remainder of the monthly payment, $1,831.00, was alimony.
According to statute, child support automatically reduces upon emancipation. Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-12-219(1). The divorce decree recognized this law. R. 56, f 3.a. Therefore,
Bruce's child support automatically reduced by $474 on June 2007 when his son became
emancipated. The divorce decree did not explicitly say that Cheryl's alimony would
increase upon emancipation, nor did the trial court's findings of fact justify a prospective
increase in alimony upon emancipation. See Richardson v. Richardson, 2008 UT 57,
fflf 8, 10, 201 P.3d 942 (prospective increase in alimony was appropriate where it was
explicitly justified based on the three statutory factors that must be considered when
making an alimony award). Therefore, according to the plain language of the divorce
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decree, Cheryl's alimony did not increase in June 2007. The trial court's miscalculation
of Bruce's judgment should be corrected and Bruce should be credited or reimbursed for
his overpayment of child support from June 2007 through December 2008.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred as a matter of law by extending
Bruce's alimony obligation from December 29, 2006 (the date of Cheryl's remarriage) to
December 1, 2010 (the date of trial). Therefore, the trial court's order that Cheryl is
entitled to a credit against Bruce for unpaid alimony due and owing through November
30, 2010 in the amount of $32,055.00 was erroneous and should be corrected to reflect
the fact that Bruce's alimony obligation automatically terminated on December 29, 2006.
In the alternative, the trial court abused its discretion by extending Bruce's alimony
obligation through the pendency of litigation despite the statutory rule that modifications
to alimony awards become effective on the month following service of a petition to
modify. Even if the trial court properly extended Bruce's alimony obligation, it
erroneously calculated Bruce's judgment without addressing whether Cheryl's alimony
increased upon the emancipation of her children, which error should be corrected.
Finally, Bruce requests attorney fees for this litigation.
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Dated this 15m day of August, 2011.
Mohrman & Schofield PC

^T?

'

Jamie G. Pleune
Michael K. Mohrman
Tracy C. Schofield
Attorneys for Appellant
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seven (7) copies, plus one digital courtesy copy per Utah Supreme Court Standing Order
No. 8, of the foregoing instrument to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street,
5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and that I have caused two (2) true and correct
copies, plus one digital courtesy copy, of the foregoing instrument to be delivered as
indicated below, on this 15th of August, 2011, to the following:

Larry B.Larsen
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
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( ) Overnight Mail
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Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2009)
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and
children — Division of debts -- Court to have continuing jurisdiction -- Custody and
parent-time — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for
modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include
the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health
insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles;
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for
the dependent children; and
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and
which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the
provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is
covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate,
current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11,
Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of
the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the
dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the
noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the
employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders
i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care,
and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and
necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by
modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the
best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the
court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered
parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable
attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that
the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a
visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a
visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred
by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise courtordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
ii
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(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a).
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial In
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the
marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in
the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing
the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may
not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living
expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that
the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage
or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be
void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a
party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.

in
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(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating
with another person.

IV
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Larry B. Larsen (7076)
Attorney for Petitioner
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)467-3331
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

,

, , ,.

OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHERYL LYN COX,
Petitioner,

)

vs.

)

BRUCE ALLAN COX,

)
)
)
)

Respondent.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Civil No. 054904297DA
Judge: ROBERT HILDER
Commissioner: Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

THIS MATTER came on regularly to be heard before the above-entitled Court, sitting
without a jury, the Honorable ROBERT HILDER, District Court Judge presiding, this
of

day

, 2005. The Petitioner represented by Petitioner's counsel, Larry B. Larsen,

submits a Written Stipulation and Property Settlement mutually agreed upon by the parties and
Petitioner's Affidavit in Support of Decree of Divorce. The Court, having made its findings of fact
and conclusions of law, hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
aecree of divorce @ J

IIHill I ~
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1.

That the Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Respondent, the

same to become final and absolute upon entry.
2.

Both parties are awarded the joint legal custody of the minor children, but that the

Petitioner be awarded the primary physical custody of the children, NICHOLAS K. COX, bom
January 8, 1989; and TAYLOR A. COX, born January 13, 1993 subject to the Respondent's right
to visit with the children at reasonable times and places. Reasonable visitation is defined as the
parties may agree. If they are not able to agree, said visitation shall include, but not limited to, that
visitation as specified in the Reasonable Visitation Schedule, attached hereto, and incorporated
herein by reference, as Exhibit "A".
3.

The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner as and for child support:
a.

A sum of not less than $1,169.00 per month as base support for the minor

children of the parties, pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines until said children
becomes 18 years of age, or have graduated from high school during the children's normal and
expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later.
b.

The base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time

periods during which a child is with the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written
agreement of the parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days.
c.

The obligee (custodial parent) shall be entitled to mandatory income with-

holding relief pursuant to U.C.A. 62A-11 Parts 4 and 5 (1953 as amended). This income with-

2
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holding procedure applies to existing and future payors, and all withheld income shall be submitted
to the Office of Recovery Services however, custodial (obligee) parent waives mandatory income
withholding relief.
d.

The issue of child support arrearage may be determined by further judicial or

administrative determination. •
e.

Each of the parties are under mutual obligation to notify the other within ten

(10) days of any change in monthly income.
4.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.15 (1953 as amended), the following is ordered:
a.

Respondent shall maintain insurance for medical expenses for the benefit of

the minor children.
b.

Respondent shall pay the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by

a parent for the children's portion of insurance.
c.

The parties shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical,

dental, vision and orthodontic expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the
minor children and actually paid by the parties.
d.

The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of

coverage to the other parent upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or
before January 2, of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent of any change of
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date that parent first knew or

->
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should have known of the change.
e.

A parent who incurs medical, dental, vision and orthodontic expenses shall

provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical, dental, vision and orthodontic
expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
f.

A parent incurring medical, dental, vision and orthodontic expenses may be

denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the
expenses if that parent fails to comply with the Subparagraphs "d" and "e" above.
5.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.16 (1953 as amended) both parties should share equally

the reasonable work-related child care expenses of the custodial parent.
a.

The non-custodial parent shall begin paying his or her share of child care

expenses on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care expense.
b.

The parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide written verification

of the cost and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a
provider and thereafter on the request of the other parent. The parent shall notify the other parent
of any change of child care provider or the monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days
of the date of the change. A parent incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to receive
credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring
the expenses fails to comply with these provisions.
6,

The Respondent is ordered to obtain life insurance on Respondent's life, so long as

4
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such is available at reasonable cost or through Respondent's employer, in a face amount of sufficient
size to provide for a monthly income equal to support payments hereunder and be ordered to
maintain in full force and effect said life insurance until the support obligation terminates. During
such period, the Respondent is ordered to irrevocably designate the Petitioner the beneficiary on said
life insurance policy.
7.

The Respondent is ordered to assume and pay, and hold the Petitioner harmless from

liability on, all debts and obligations incurred by the parties prior to their date of separation, June 29,
2005. Thereafter, it is reasonable and proper that all debts and obligations contracted by the parties
is the responsibility of the party who incurred the particular debt.
8.

Personal property is awarded to each of the parties as they have heretofore divided

9.

The parties real property, a home located at 194 North 400 West, Huntington, Utah

it.

84528 is awarded to the Petitioner be awarded exclusive use and possession of the home and real
property and that the Respondent receive an equitable lien in said property in the amount of
$25,000.00 in an amount equal to one-half of the net equity accrued by the parties as of the date of
the Decree in this matter. The Petitioner is ordered to pay the $25,000.00 to the Respondent when
the first of the following conditions occur.
I.

The children of the parties reach eighteen (18) years of age, marries,

or otherwise become emancipated;
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ii.

The Petitioner remarries;

iii.

The Petitioner ceases to use the home as the primary residence;

iv.

The Petitioner cohabits with a non-relative adult of the opposite sex

v.

The Respondent may at his discretion deduct $25,000.00 from the

in the home.

Petitioner's share of the Respondent's retirement benefits if he chooses to do so to satisfy the equity
payout described above.
10.

Neither party shall be awarded alimony from the other party.

11.

The Petitioner should receive one-half (Vi) of all pension and/or profit sharing plans

or other retirement benefits acquired by the Respondent through Respondent's place of employment.
12.

The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner the sum of $3,000.00 per month for the

period often (10) years as and for a final property settlement. Said payment shall include the child
support payment described above in paragraph 6.
13.

The Respondent is entitled to claim the parties' minor children as a tax deductions.

14.

The Respondent is ordered to pay the Petitioner's attorney's fees, in the sum of not

less than $750.00.
15.

It is reasonable and proper that the Petitioner be restored the use of her former name,

Petty, if she so desires.
16.

Each party is hereby ordered to duly execute and deliver all documents necessary to
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effect the Decree of Divorce.
DATED this 3&~ day of y

^

, 2005.

BY THE COURT:
/

/

/

ROBERT HILDER ^~""
District Court Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned certifies t X a copy, of the proposed Decree of Divorce was sent via U.S.
mail, postage pre-paid, this fjh_ ay of /^ATX^JT
, 2005? to the Respondent, BRUCE
ALLAN COX, at Respondent's last known addrtefc, 856 Hilltop, Salt Lake City. Utah 84103.
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ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY #2665
Attorney for Respondent
Bank of the West Building
140 West 9000 South, Suite 7
Sandy, Utah 84070-2033
Telephone: (801) 566-9286
Facsimile: (801) 562-5151
Email:Pusey law@AOL.com

P"ty Clark

REVISED 1/28/2011

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

CHERYL LYN COX,
Petitioner.

FINDINGS OF FACT
and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
BRUCE ALLAN COX,
Respondent.

Civil No. 054904297 DA
Judge Robert K. Hilder
Comm. T. Patrick Casey

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER came on for trial on December 1st, 2010, the
Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding. Petitioner appeared personally, and by and through her
counsel of record, Larry B. Larsen. Respondent appeared personally, and by and tlxough his
counsel of record, Robert Devin Pusey.
The Court took testimony from several witnesses and admitted exhibits from both
parties which were entered into the record of the proceedings. The Court then heard closing
arguments from counsel, and took the matter under advisement.
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On December 30 \ 2010 the Court made and entered its written Ruling and Order and
served the same upon the parties.
NOW, based upon the record and file in this action, the testimony adduced and
documents received during hearing, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were married in 1980, and divorced pursuant to a stipulated Decree

on August 30th, 2005.
2.

In about June, 2005 petitioner informed respondent that she wanted a divorce.

Without going into details, the Court finds it sufficient to say that the petitioner articulated
strong justification for her desire to end the marriage. Respondent was not in favor of a
divorce, but neither was he interested in changing his lifestyle in a way that might have
permitted the marriage to continue.
3.

Within an apparently very short time after stating her desire to obtain a divorce,

petitioner retained her present attorney, Larry Larsen. Mr. Larsen took prompt action and sent
a proposed written Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement to respondent on August 3,
2005. Mr. Larsen's letter included the following paragraph:
You will notice that instead of an alimony payment for the length of the
marriage (25 years), Cheryl has decided to request a $3,000 per month property
settlement for ten (10) years. This $3,000 amount includes the child support
payments. This will give Cheryl a steady income of $3,000 for ten years, which will
2
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allow her enough income to obtain training so that she can get a job and support
herself.
4.

The testimony is undisputed that shortly thereafter, respondent met with Mr.

Larsen. Respondent requested that he be granted tax exemptions for the children, and he also
requested the ability to deduct the mortgage interest on the marital home. The final
Stipulation and Decree shows that respondent received the tax exemptions for the children,
but it is silent on the issue of the mortgage interest. Nevertheless, respondent's testimony
that he was not able to take the mortgage interest is undisputed.
5.

The testimony shows that there was very little negotiation regarding terms, and

that neither petitioner nor respondent had any sophisticated legal understanding of the
difference between property settlements and alimony provisions, but that both understood the
purpose of the ten years was to provide a form of support to petitioner. At the time of the
divorce, petitioner was earning about $900 per month, and that is approximately her present
income. Petitioner lacks the training or job-related skills that would permit her to earn more
in the present economy, and the objective that she be provided sufficient support to give her
time to obtain additional qualifications was clearly important to both parties.
6.

On the other hand, the evidence is overwhelmingly clear that there was in fact

no marital property, or for that matter even separate property, in existence at the time of
divorce that could fairly be said to be the subject of a property settlement. The parties owned
a house, but the house was divided separately from any other property settlement, with
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petitioner receiving ownership and possession of the house, subject to payment of
approximately 50% of the equity (or $25,000) to respondent, on the happening of one of
several events. The other major item of property was respondent's Rocky Mountain Power
retirement account, which was divided equally pursuant to the Woodward formula. There was
absolutely no other property except the parties' vehicles, which were of very little value, and
each took his or her own vehicle.
7.

Subsequent to the divorce, on December 29, 2006, petitioner remarried. She is

presently still married, but is now separated from her husband, and is not planning on
reconciliation. She and her present husband have been separated for about six weeks at the
time of trial.
8.

Petitioner never affirmatively advised respondent that she had remarried, but

neither is there sufficient evidence to determine that she took steps to conceal the fact from
him. The evidence is undisputed that respondent has had very little contact with either
petitioner or the parties' children since separation.
9.

At the time of the divorce, the parties had two children who were still minors.

The older of the two has since emancipated. The youngest son will turn 18 on January 13,
2011, and he should graduate from his high school in June, 2011.
10.

As noted above, the Agreement and Decree provided that the $3,000 monthly

"property settlement" shall include the child support obligation. At the time of divorce, that
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obligation was $ 1,169 for both children. In June, 2007, when the older child was
emancipated, the support for one child dropped to $695. It has been the petitioner's position
that while child support is included in the $3,000 monthly payment, upon reduction of the
child support amount due, the total sum remains at $3,000, with the payment for property
settlement increasing accordingly.
11.

In fact, commencing in September 2005, respondent paid $3,524.00 per month

through December 2008 (a total of forty months), when he stopped paying any amount in
addition to the $695 child support then owing for one remaining child. The Court notes that
the parties initially agreed that the Respondent paid $3,500 per month for the period in
question, but evidence at trial revealed that the sum was $3,524, and petitioner accepted that
revised amount.
12.

The evidence establishes that in the event the Court construes the Stipulation

and Divorce Decree as petitioner argues, at the end of the ten year period, respondent will
have paid a total of $298,461 for property settlement payments. While such an obligation
suggests that the parties divided marital property, in addition to the real property that was
addressed separately, in the approximate amount of $600,000, the evidence does not support
such a possibility, or even a fraction of that sum.
13.

The evidence establishes that the parties did not specifically discuss alimony,

but neither did they discuss property division other than the house, retirement or personal
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property already addressed herein. What the parties did discuss, albeit primarily through
petitioner's counsel, with very limited discussions at that, was a compromise settlement
crafted to provide support in the form of a stream of income to petitioner.
14.

Neither petitioner nor respondent had any understanding of tax consequences

of paying or receiving alimony, nor did they understand the rules governing termination of
alimony.
15.

Respondent suggest that there is at least an implication that petitioner was

contemplating remarriage at the time the Stipulation was executed and the Decree entered, but
the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to support such a conclusion.
16.

Respondent became aware of the remarriage in 2008, about eighteen months

after the event. At that time respondent continued to pay $3,524 per month, until January
2009, when, on advice of counsel that he did not owe the full amount, he reduced his payment
to the $695 child support then owing for the one remaining child. He has paid only that sum
every month since January 1, 2009.
17.

Because respondent paid in excess of his obligation for the first forty months,

as of December 31, 2008 he had overpaid $20,960.00.
18.

About one year after the divorce was entered, petitioner commenced training as

a medical transcriptionist, but she interrupted that training after she remarried and has not
engaged in any other job training. She lacks a degree, and she does not have any computer
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skills. She presently earns about $900 per month as a school resource aid.
19.

Respondent's counsel filed a Petition for Modification on February 12, 2009.

That Petition alleged a material change in circumstances, and it also requested the Court to
determine that the property settlement was alimony.
20.

If the Court treats the matter before it as a true modification, then any change

typically occurs retroactively to the first month following service of the petition, which in this
case would be March 1, 2009. As of that date, because respondent had reduced his payment
to child support only, his overpayment amount was $16,350. An accurate summary of the
support obligations owing and paid is attached hereto for illustrative purposes as an exhibit.
21.

Respondent alleges the following substantial and material changes: the

emancipation of one child; remarriage of the petitioner; and the monthly overpayment in the
amount of $524. With the exception of the overpayment, the Court finds there was no
evidence that the changes were not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. With respect to the
overpayment, that is factually not a change but simply an occurrence that gives rise to an
accounting issue, and the overpayment is not in dispute.
22.

Based upon the facts recited above, and the applicable law, the Court first

concludes that the matter before it is not ultimately a bona fide petition to modify, because
respondent fails to prove any substantial material changes in circumstances that were "not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code Ann §30-3-5(8)(g)(i) Remarriage is
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generally foreseeable, and no facts were adduced at trial to suggest that this case differs from
the norm. The emancipation of one child was equally expected, as was the imminent
emancipation of the youngest son. The unusual circumstance is that in this case emancipation
of first one, then both minors, purports to grant no relief to respondent, because all support is
styled as property settlement. It is this unusual feature that causes the Court to consider the
Petition on a basis other than changed circumstances. The district court "has continuing
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for . . . distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3) In his
Petition, respondent asks the Court to find that the property settlement is, in fact, alimony.
This request calls upon the Court to interpret a Decree that has governed the parties for more
than five years, where respondent now argues that continuing the obligations set forth creates
an inequitable outcome. Regardless of whether the issue is interpretation of the Decree, or
modification of a purported property settlement, or to more correctly recognize and give
substance to the agreement between the parties, this Court finds that modification, or "changes
of new orders" is supported by statute, case law and equitable principles.
23.

The Court first addresses modification of property settlements generally, then

determines that the settlement in the present case was child support and alimony, or spousal
support/maintenance.
24.

First, while even true property settlement s are rarely modified, both case law

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and statute cited above make it clear that property settlements are subject to modification, or
as stated in the statute "subsequent changes or new orders." §30-3-5(3) See Chandler v.
West, 610 P.2d 1299, 1300 (Utah 1980)
25.

Second, "when categorizing items in a divorce decree, courts should look to

substance over form to determine whether the debt [of an obligor spouse to a receiving
spouse] is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support."5 Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 Ut.
App. 134, ^j26, 183 P.3d 1052, 1059 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008) citing Holt v. Holt, 672 P.2d 738,
743 (Utah 1983) The Court recognizes that Swallow was a default case in which the
husband's characterization of the nature of the payment was undisputed, but in fact the
evidence in the present case was equally undisputed. Petitioner made no case, either legally or
factually, in support of a claim that the payments (except the child support portion) were
anything other than a form of spousal support. The entire thrust of her argument was that the
parties entered into a stipulation, and the parties and Court must be bound by that agreement.
26.

Petitioner cites four cases in support of her argument, staring with Land v.

Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), a true property settlement case, in which the Court ruled:
"Equity is not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply
because one has come to regret the bargain made." Id. at 1251 All three of the subsequent
cases quote the Land language, and all three deal with bona fide property division, not with
issues of support or maintenance re-characterized as property settlement. Lea v. Bowers, 658
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P.2d 1213 (Utah 1983); Coleman v. Coleman, 681 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984); and Jense v. Jense,
784 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1989)
27.

Respondent's cases are more helpful. Starting with a 1949 Utah Supreme

Court case, the cases instruct that the proper focus of the Court's inquiry is: "whether the
'property settlement' was really an award for the support and maintenance of defendant's
wife." Lyon v. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.2d 148 (Utah 1948) In Lyon the wife received
$7,800 worth of real and personal property; the husband received about $460 worth. As the
trial court observed: "Divisions of property between divorce litigants are not normally made
upon a basis of 1/16 to the husband and 15/16 to the wife." Id. The Lyon case arose in the
perhaps more common context of dischargeability of a debt in bankruptcy, and it was to the
wife's benefit that the debt be re-characterized as support, but the underlying principals apply
regardless of context. See also Bott v. Bott 22 Ytah 2d 368; 453 P.2d 402 (Utah 1969)
(characterization of debt in contempt context); and Holt v. Holt, 672 P.2d 738 (Utah 1983)
28.

In the present case, if the purported property settlement was based upon actual

property, and respondent in fact received 1/16 of that property, he would have at least received
close to $20,000 worth of marital property. Of course, there was in fact virtually no property
underlying the property settlement agreement, and respondent received nothing of value in
return for his promise to pay close to $300,000 over ten years.
29.

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the property settlement
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agreement in the present case was in actuality an agreement to pay $3,000 per month for ten
years with part of that amount designated as statutory child support as long as it was owed,
and the balance to serve as support for the wife, or more baldly stated, as alimony. Because
Petitioner remarried sixteen months after the Decree was entered, it is now a moot question
whether the alimony/support portion of the payment was intended to increase as the child
support obligation was first reduced, then terminated.
30.

Having determined that the property settlement set forth in the Decree is, in

fact, alimony, the Court is obligated to determine that petitioner's entitlement to alimony
terminates by operation of law upon remarriage [Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(9)], but the Court
finds that there are equitable grounds to postpone the date of termination until date of trial in
this case.
31.

First, neither party initially recognized the effect of the property settlement

characterization of the support obligation, and neither entered into their stipulation relying on
a termination of support on the occurrence of any of the bases set forth in the statute. On the
other hand, petitioner has relied, in good faith, on the expectation that support payments of as
much as $3,000 per month would continue for a full ten years, or until August 30th, 2015. It is
reasonable to determine that petitioner to this day anticipated that she still has some time to
complete necessary training to improve her earning ability, but based upon the Court's present
Ruling, any such opportunity is now foreclosed.
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32.

Second, petitioner is now separated, and she lacks any present or reasonably

foreseeable future ability to repay any sums that would be owed if the Court terminated the
alimony at the earlier date of remarriage, or even effective March 1, 2009, the first month after
service of the Petition to Modify. This Court concludes that petitioner reasonably relied upon
respondent's commitment to pay her a sum certain for a full ten years. For the foregoing
reasons, and because respondent has withheld the "alimony" portion since the beginning of
2009, petitioner is without resources to repay support if the termination date is any earlier than
the December 1, 2010 trial of this matter.
33.

-

Third, the Court is not now modifying the decree based upon a change of

circumstances which would perhaps dictate a specific effective date. Instead, at respondent's
request the Court is modifying the Decree based upon a legal interpretation of an ambiguous
provision that would work an injustice to respondent, primarily prospectively, if he is required
to continue paying the full support agreed even after the last child emancipates. In addition,
based upon the evidence before the Court, the respondent is in a far better financial position
than petitioner to bear the loss incurred up to the present. The child support worksheet
submitted as Respondent's Exhibit D shows his income as $7,764 per month, and he is also
entitled to receive payment of his $25,000 home equity share from petitioner, plus interest.
34.

Addressing the home equity issue, petitioner was obligated to pay respondent

his $25,000 share of home equity upon any one of several occurrences, including remarriage.
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She did not make the payment, and she did not even notify respondent of the remarriage.
When respondent became aware of the remarriage he could have elcted to take his equity from
petitioner's share of the Rocky Mountain Power retirement benefits, but he is not required to
do so. Because the payment has not been made, respondent is entitled to interest on the
principal from the end of December 2007. Respondent argues that he should receive prejudgment interest at the legal rate of 10% for the entire time. The Court agrees he should
receive interest, but as an equitable matter, the Court considers that once respondent learned
of the remarriage, he could have received a judgment at any time, which judgment would bear
interest, until paid, at the lower post-judgment rate. Petitioner is liable for the full ten percent
from January 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008, the approximate undisputed date on which
respondent learned of the remarriage, and could have received a judgment. The postjudgment interest rate for 2008 was 5.42%. An accurate summary of the princifjpand interest
calculations is attached hereto for illustrative purposes as an exhibit.
35.

This case imposes burdens on both parties. The issue presented raised

meritorious arguments on both sides. Respondent is the prevailing party, and petitioner has
the greater financial need. In light of these countervailing factors, none of which mandate a
fee award, the Court determines that it is equitable that each party bear his and her own fees
and costs.
NOW, having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes the
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following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Respondent's obligation to make the $3,000 per month payments to petitioner

as previously set forth in the Decree of Divorce should terminate effective the date of trial,
December 1,2010.
2.

On and after that date respondent should be responsible for only the child

support due the remaining child at the rate of $695.00 per month, payable for the term set
forth in the Decree of Divorce.
3.

Petitioner is entitled to a credit against respondent for unpaid alimony due and

owing through November 30, 2010 in the amount of $32,055.00.
4.

Respondent is entitled to a credit against petitioner for his equitable lien on the

former marital residence and interest thereupon in the amount of $32,515.04.
5.

Judgment should enter in favor of respondent and against petitioner in the

amount of $460.04, representing the difference between to foregoing values, to bear interest at
the post-judgment rate ofjpS5Hs» per annum.
6.

Each party should be ordered to assume and pay their respective attorney's fees

and costs incurred in this matter.
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.2011.

DATED this

BY THE COURT:

Third District Court Judge

APPROVED as to form & content
this J [ ^ d a v o f J W , ^ 2 0 H .

LARRY B . L A R j S J
Attorney for Petitioner

^

RULE 7(T)(7) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I served a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by first class mail, postage pre-paid, this
^ S day of January, 2011, to:
LARRY B. LARSEN
Attorney for Petitioner
352Ji^9^^ouiii
/ S a l t L a k e City, UT J^LA-HC"
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COX v. COX
Civil No. 054904297 DA
FINAL ACCOUNTING OF PAYMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENT
*****Decree of Divorced entered August 30* , 2005
AMT DUE

AMT PAID

ADJUST

BALANCE

September

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$524

October

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$1,048

November

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$1,572

December

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$2,096

January

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$2,620

February

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$3,144

March

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$3,668

April

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$4,192

May

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$4,716

June

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$5,240

July

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$5,764

August

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$6,288

September

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$6,812

2005

Zvvo
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October

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$7,336

November

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$7,860

December

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$8,384

January

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$8,908

February

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$9,432

March

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$9,956

April

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$10,480

May

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$11,004

June

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$11,528

July

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$12,052

August

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$12,576

September

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$13,100

October

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$13,624

November

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$14,148

December

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$14,672

January

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$15,196

February

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$15,720

March

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$16,244

April

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$16,768

May

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$17,292

2008
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June

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$17,816

July

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$18,340

August

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$18,864

September

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$19,388

October

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$19,912

November

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$20,436

December

$3,000

$3,524

$524

$20,960

January

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

$18,655

February

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

$16,350

March '

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

$14,045

April

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

$11,740

May

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

$9,435

June

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

$7,130

July

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

$4,825

August

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

$2,520

September

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

$215

October

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(2,090)

November

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(4,395)

December

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(6,700)

2009
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2010
January

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(9,005)

February

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(11,310)

March '

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(13,615)

April

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(15,920)

May

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(18,255)

June

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(20,530)

July

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(22,835)

August

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(25,140)

September

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(27,445)

October

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(29,750)

November

$3,000

$695

(2,305)

(32,055)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

COX v. COX
Civil No. 054904297 DA
HOME EQUITY SUMMARY
$25,000 DUE ON PETITIONER'S REMARRIAGE
Date of remarriage - December 29 th , 2006
—oooOooo—
Pre-judgment interest at 10% [UCA§ 15-1-1(2)]
until June 30th, 2008
$25,000.00
Annual interest = $2,500.00

<

Daily rate = $6,849
January 1st, 2007 through June 30, 2008
<

547 days @ $6.849/day = $2,312.93

SUBTOTAL THIS PERIOD:

$3,746.40

$28,746.40

<

<
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Post-judgment interest at 5.42%
until December 1st, 2010
Carry over amount:

$28,746.40

Annual interest = $1,558.05
Daily rate = $4,268
June 30, 2008 through December 1st, 2010
883 days @ $4,268/ day = $3,768.64
SUBTOTAL THIS PERIOD:

$3,768.64

TOTAL CLAIM FOR EQUITY THROUGH TRIAL DATE: $32,515.04
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